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It is both logical and inevitable in a discussion of the legal control of
the use of force by the members of the international community that
the absence of and need for a legal definition of aggression is mentioned.
Over the past five decades, intermittent attempts have been made in
both the League of Nations and the United Nations to formulate such
a legal definition.' We are all aware that during this same time acts of
aggression have occurred and in some instances have been appropriately
condemned and punished by members of the international community.
To speculate whether the existence of a specific legal definition of ag-
gression would have deterred the decision-makers from committing
these acts is provocative, but not conclusive. Nevertheless, that the
existence of such a definition might have deterred certain aggressive acts
is sufficient reason for some scholars and state authorities to continue
*Chairman, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland.
'The following sources are useful in examining the historical development of attempts to define
aggression. Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 12
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1957); Report of the Secretary-General, Oct. 3, 1952,
on the Question of Defining Aggression, 7 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 54, at 17,
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to advocate the need for a concerted effort to formulate a legal defini-
tion of aggression. Accordingly, notwithstanding the repeated failures
in the efforts to define aggression, the matter remains on the interna-
tional agenda and periodic attempts within the United Nations are
made to formulate an acceptable definition.
The attempts at definition, while a legal exercise requiring the preci-
sion and skill of the international lawyer, are fundamentally a political
exercise that exposes basic philosophical differences between states re-
garding the desirability of the task and the utility of the possible prod-
uct. My purpose here is to examine briefly the attempts that have been
made to formulate a legal definition of aggression and to consider the
types of definition that have been proposed and the difficulties inherent
in each.
Although we must acknowledge that the members of the international
community have not been able to agree upon a legal definition of aggres-
sion, we must recognize that the concept of aggression is fundamental
to contemporary international law and international relations. The
judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal makes it clear that acts of aggres-
sion are illegal under international law.
States utilize the concept without definition in a wide range of both
bilateral and multilateral nonaggression or mutual-defense treaties. In
the former they pledge not to commit aggression against the other treaty
parties. In the latter they pledge to come to the assistance of other treaty
parties who are the victims of an armed attack or acts of aggression.
Moreover, the lack of a specific legal definition of aggression has not
impaired the ability of either the League of Nations or the United
Nations to find that certain states were guilty of acts of aggression. The
League Assembly made such a finding with regard to the Soviet Union's
invasion of Finland in 1939,2 and in 1951 the General Assembly found
that both North Korea and Communist China had committed aggres-
sion against South Korea.3
We should also acknowledge that some scholars and state authorities
assert that decision-makers should and can employ the concept without
specific legal definition. They assert that there is a conventional or
natural definition of the term that provides decision-makers with a
standard that can be utilized to examine acts involving the use of force.
'Report of the Secretary-General, Oct. 3, 1952, on the Question of Defining Aggression, Criteria.
Applied When a Conflict Has Been Accompanied by the Use of Force § VIII, para. 96, 7 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 54, at 17, 36-38, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952), reprinted in 5
M. WITEMAN, supra note I, at 729.
'G.A. Res. 498, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20A, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/1775/Add.I (1951).
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Their point is analogous to the view that while one cannot define love
or hate in all of its meanings, one can experience it or observe it.
Before we begin to discuss the types of definitions that have been
proposed and the efforts that have been made, it is instructive to men-
tion briefly the pros and cons regarding the desirability and feasibility
of a legal definition of aggression. The debates within the United Na-
tions on the subject and the reports of the special committees contain a
full spectrum of viewpoints by state authorities.' The writings of legal
scholars such as Quincy Wright,5 Julius Stone,6 D.W. Bowett,7 and Ian
Brownlie8 are well known.
In support of the benefits of a legal definition to the members of the
international community, it is asserted that a legal definition will enable
the United Nations to be more effective in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and order. A legal definition will enable the members of
the Security Council or General Assembly to determine which state
violated the international order. Article 39 of the Charter provides that
the Security Council may make a determination of an "act of aggres-
sion" and decide what measures should be taken to restore international
peace and security. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution,' the Gen-
eral Assembly may make a finding of an "act of aggression" and make
recommendations to the members for collective measures to maintain
or restore international peace. Once the delinquent state is identified,
the community is able to impose appropriate sanctions against the law-
breaker.
It is also asserted that a legal definition will have a deterrent effect
upon national decision-makers. If certain behavior is clearly and specifi-
cally prohibited and national decision-makers know that violations will
be punished, they may be deterred from the contemplated act. (We must
comment here that the certainty that lawbreakers will be appropriately
punished by the international community does not automatically or
necessarily follow from the existence of a legal definition of aggression.)
A clear definition will eliminate the possibility that national decision-
makers might commit aggression through ignorance or inadvertence.
It is furthermore asserted that a legal definition will assist the com-
munity in making decisions regarding self-defense. If a state has com-
'For a collection of sources that record some of these views, see note I supra.
5E.g., Q. WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR (1961).
"E.g., J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1954).
7E.g., D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958).
'E.g., I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963).
g5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc A/1775 (1950).
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mitted an act that is defined as aggressive, it cannot assert a claim of
self-defense to cover its illegal activities.
Finally, it is asserted that a definition of aggression would have an
automatic quality; that is, it would provide no opportunity for the na-
tional decision-makers to raise political considerations. In other words,
the legal definition would prevent nonlegal considerations, contribute to
uniform perceptions of events, and facilitate difficult judgments of cause
and effect. The following quotation from Quincy Wright is appropriate:
Definitions of aggression and self-defense, resting as far as possible on
easily observable facts rather than on motives or attitudes, are, there-
fore, of major importance, especially in view of the difficulty of deci-
sion in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Discretion on
these matters should be reduced to the minimum.
It is true that the Charter intended to give a considerable discretion
to the Security Council to decide such issues on the basis of the facts
of a situation; and on some questions, such as what constitutes a threat
to use armed force or a threat to the peace, discretion is necessary.
Experience, however, underlines the need for definitions as precise as
possible of what constitutes, for example, aggression, so that states will
not commit it through inadvertence or through ignorance. . . . United
Nations organs should not be able to evade their responsibility if a
transgression occurs . . . . Those who have sought to make the term
aggression identical with injustice have misconceived the function of
the term in the Charter and in international law. It is a rule of order,
not of justice.10
The contrary arguments center on both the undesirability of a specific
legal definition and the unlikelihood of any agreeable formulation. It is
asserted that the legal aspects of the use of force represent only a part
of the problem. The use of force is more than a legal problem; rather it
has political, economic and ideological characteristics that must be
taken into account by the decision-makers in making any determination
of the existence of acts of aggression. It is also asserted that the applica-
tion of a specific legal definition (especially an enumerative definition)
will require the decision-makers to exercise a very narrow focus on the
alleged acts. While this narrow focus may assist the community in
maintaining international order, it may do so at the expense of justice
for a particular state whose acts may be justified in a larger context. A
specific definition is dangerous, since it would be incomplete and thus
invite evasive action by states to avoid the application of sanctions.
Perfidious decision-makers would seek loopholes in the definition to
"Q. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 14.
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frustrate the will of the international community or to blame an inno-
cent party. The failure thus far to formulate a definition illustrates the
complexities of the problem and the specific difficulties of each of the
proposed definitions. Because of the deficiencies that can be cited for
each type of definition, it is concluded that no definition will really be
useful to the members of the international community.
Although the view does not appear to have been set forth in public
by state authorities, it must be pointed out that a specific definition of
aggression would give to international law a degree of specificity regard-
ing the use of force that has not existed to date. Decision-makers appear
to prefer a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty with respect to the
international legal rules regarding the right to resort to the use of force.
The specificity that might be set forth in a legal definition could circum-
scribe the ability of decision-makers to resort unilaterally to the use of
force for the protection of national security.
The scholars and state authorities who argue against the utility of a
specific definition of aggression prefer to let the appropriate interna-
tional organ evaluate each alleged incident and make a decision within
the general framework of a "natural" definition of aggression. Whether
it is because of the persuasiveness of their arguments or the recalcitrance
of state authorities, one must acknowledge that the opponents to a legal
definition have to date prevailed.
John Hazard points out that the differences among state authorities
concerning the desirability and feasibility of a legal definition of aggres-
sion may be attributable in part to their differing legal traditions. Those
who favor a legal definition are to a large extent participants in a
Roman-law tradition with emphasis on a detailed code of law; those
who prefer the "natural" approach are to a large part participants in a
common-law tradition with emphasis on the exercise of judicial wisdom
in particular cases."
As one reviews the history of the efforts over the past five decades to
formulate a legal definition of aggression, several specific developments
stand out. The first to note is the Politis definition of aggression pre-
pared for the Committee on Security Questions at the Conference for
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments held at Geneva, 1932-
1933, under the auspices of the League of Nations. Although this defini-
tion was not adopted by the Conference it has had substantial impact
on subsequent discussions. The Politis definition provides that the ag-
gressor in an international conflict is that state which first commits one
"Hazard, Why Try Again to Define Aggression?, 62 A.J.I.L. 701, 703-06 (1968).
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of five specific acts listed therein. These acts include a declaration of
war, invasion of armed forces into the territory of another state, attack
by military forces on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state,
naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state, and the provision
of support to armed bands formed within a state's territory which have
invaded the territory of another state. 12 (We shall discuss later the diffi-
culties inherent in the application of the enumerative definition.)
The consistent interest of the Soviet Union in the formulation of an
enumerative definition of aggression is also evident over the past de-
cades. Soviet representatives submitted an extended, enumerative defi-
nition to the Committee on Security Questions mentioned above. In
fact, the Politis definition is substantially based upon a definition sub-
mitted to the Committee by the Soviet delegation. In 1933 the Soviet
Union also signed three conventions with its neighbors that contained
the Politis definition of aggression. Although there have been some
modifications in its proposals, with recent proposals containing refer-
ences to indirect aggression, economic aggression, and ideological ag-
gression, the Soviet Union has pressed within the United Nations for
the adoption of an enumerative definition similar to the one it proposed
in 1933.
While the Soviet Union has consistently pressed for the adoption of
an enumerative definition of aggression, the United States, in contrast,
has followed an uneven policy. In the formulation of the London
Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, the United States sought the
adoption of a modified Politis definition as a part of the Charter."3 In
this instance it was opposed by the Soviet Union which argued that such
a definition was unnecessary as a part of the Charter. Within the debates
in the United Nations, the United States has manifested a policy of
general opposition to the formulation of a specific definition, preferring
to allow the Security Council or the General Assembly to exercise judg-
ment with the benefit of a "natural" definition of aggression. In a
different approach, the reasons for which I can only speculate, the
United States in 1969 joined with several other states in proposing a
mixed definition of aggression for consideration by the General Assem-
bly's Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. 4
"
2For the text of the Politis definition and additional commentary, see 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 734-36 (1965).
3See Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Confer-
ence on Military Trials, London 1945, at 294 (Dep't of State Pub. No. 3080, 1949), reprinted in 5
M. WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 853-54.
1'24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (1969).
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Within the context of the United Nations several attempts have been
made to formulate a definition of aggression that would enable the
Organization to have a specific and agreed-upon standard to apply in-
instances involving the use of force. In 1950 the General Assembly
asked the International Law Commission to consider the question of
defining aggression. The Commission considered several alternative def-
initions, but the members were unable to reach agreement, and no
recommendation was forwarded to the General Assembly.
In addition to the activity of the International Law Commission, the
General Assembly has established special committees for the purpose
of defining aggression and reporting to the Assembly. The activities of
these special committees have been intermittent and have sharply ex-
posed the basic differences among the members regarding the type of
definition to be sought and the language to be employed. As in many
United Nations activities, basic differences among states which are an-
ticipated on this issue are complicated and exacerbated because of "cold
war" differences. One must conclude that the United Nations activities
in this area have neither strengthened the international organization nor
clarified the rules of international law.
It should be noted that although the United Nations has been unable
to formulate a definition of aggression, the Act of Chapultepec 5 and the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty, 1947)16
contain mixed definitions of aggression. (We shall discuss the Rio
Treaty definition below.) In noting this, we must acknowledge that the
problems that confronted the Inter-American states on this matter were
less intensive than those confronting states in the United Nations.
It is now appropriate to examine the definitions of aggression that
have been proposed and to consider the difficulties that would confront
national decision-makers in the foreign offices and in the United Na-
tions in the application of the definitions. I shall accomplish the latter
analysis by applying the proposed definitions of aggression to the Arab-
Israeli conflict of 1967.11
First, let us consider the types of proposed definitions. They fall into
three broad categories: the enumerative definitions, the general-
principles definitions, and the mixed definitions. The enumerative defi-
"Agreement on Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity, Mar. 8, 1945, in INTER-AMERICAN CON-
FERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE, MEXICO CITY, FEBRUARY 21-MARCH 8, 1945, at 30-
33 (Pan American Union, Congress and Conference Series No. 47, 1945), 60 Stat. 1831, T.I.A.S.
No. 1543.
"Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 93.
"71 have previously utilized this analysis in an unpublished paper presented at the Southern
Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law held at Tulane University in 1968.
19721
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
nitions provide a specific listing of acts that constitute aggression with
the provision that the state that first commits one of the acts is guilty
of aggression. The listing of prohibited acts is usually exhaustive, al-
though this may not always be the case, so that only those acts specified
in the definition constitute aggression. This type definition also lists acts
that may not be used as justification for the prohibited acts. The
general-principles definitions provide a comprehensive formula for de-
termining aggression under particular circumstances. The interpretation
of the formula and its application to a particular conflict are left to the
discretion and judgment of the members of the appropriate interna-
tional organ. The mixed definitions contain a general statement prohib-
iting the use of force in international relations and an open list of acts
that constitute aggression. The list illustrates the aggressive act, but
does not specifically define it. The appropriate international organ has
the authority to specify any other act as aggression according to the
particular situation.
In dealing specifically with an enumerative-type definition of aggres-
sion, a useful reference may be made to the draft definition submitted
to the United Nations by the Soviet Union in 1956.18 The text of the
definition follows:
1. In an international conflict that State shall be declared the at-
tacker which first commits one of the following acts:
(a) Declaration of war against another State;
(b) Invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration
of war, of the territory of another State;
(c) Bombardment by its land, sea or air forces of the terri-
tory of another State or the carrying out of a deliberate attack
on the ships or aircraft of the latter;
(d) The landing or leading of its land, sea or air forces inside
the boundaries of another State without the permission of the
government of the latter, or the violation of the conditions of
such permission, particularly as regards the length of their
stay or the extent of the area in which they may stay;
(e) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
(f) Support of armed bands organized in its own territory
which invade the territory of another State, or refusal, on
being requested by the invaded State, to take in its own terri-
tory any action within its power to deny such bands any aid
or protection.
"
8Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 12 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 30-31, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1957).
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2. That State shall be declared to have committed an act of indirect
aggression which:
(a) Encourages subversive activity against another State
(acts of terrorism, diversion, etc.);
(b) Promotes the fomenting of civil war within another
State;
(c) Promotes an internal upheaval in another State or a
change of policy in favour of the aggressor.
3. That State shall be declared to have committed an act of economic
aggression which first commits one of the following acts:
(a) Takes against another State measures of economic pres-
sure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and
threatening the bases of its economic life;
(b) Takes against another State measures preventing it from
exploiting or nationalizing its own natural riches;
(c) Subjects another State to an economic blockade.
4. That State shall be declared to have committed an act of ideologi-
cal aggression which:
(a) Encourages war propaganda;
(b) Encourages propaganda in favour of using atomic, bac-
terial, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction;
(c) Promotes the propagation of fascist-nazi views, of racial
and national exclusiveness, and of hatred and contempt for
other peoples.
5. Acts committed by a State other than those listed in the preceding
paragraphs may be deemed to constitute aggression if declared by
decision of the Security Council in a particular case to be an attack
or an act of economic, ideological or indirect aggression.
6. The attacks referred to in paragraph I and the acts of economic,
ideological and indirect aggression referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and
4 may not be justified by any considerations of a political, strategic or
economic nature, or by the desire to exploit natural riches in the terri-
tory of the State attacked or to derive any other kind of advantages
or privileges, or by reference to the amount of capital invested in that
territory, or by the refusal to recognize that it possesses the distinguish-
ing marks of statehood.
In particular, the following may not be used as justifications:
A. The internal position of any State, as for example:
(a) The backwardness of any people politically, economi-
cally, or culturally;
(b) Alleged shortcomings of its administration;
(c) Any danger which may threaten the life or property of
aliens;
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(d) Any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement,
civil war, disorders or strikes;
(e) The establishment or maintenance in any State of any
political, economic or social system.
B. Any acts, legislation or orders of any State, as for example:
(a) Violation of international treaties;
(b) Violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade,
concessions or any other kind of economic activity acquired
by another State or its citizens;
(c) Rupture of diplomatic or economic relations;
(d) Measures constituting an economic or financial boycott;
(e) Repudiation of debts;
(f) Prohibition or restriction of immigration or modification
of the status of foreigners;
(g) Violation of privileges recognized to the official repre-
sentatives of another State;
(h) Refusal to allow the passage of armed forces proceeding
to the territory of a third State;
(i) Measures of a religious or anti-religious nature;
() Frontier incidents.
7. In any event of the mobilization or concentration by another State
of considerable armed forces near its frontier, the State which is
threatened by such action shall have the right of recourse to diplomatic
or other means of securing a peaceful settlement of international dis-
putes. It may also in the meantime take counter-measures of a military
nature similar to those described above, without, however, crossing the
frontier.
For the general principles definition, I shall use the definition favored,
but not adopted by the International Law Commission in 1950.19 The
definition is as follows:
Aggression is the threat or use of force by a State or Government
against another State, in any manner, whatever the weapons employed
and whether openly or otherwise, for any reason or for any purpose
other than individual or collective self-defense or in pursuance of a
decision or recommendation by a competent organ of the United Na-
tions.
For the mixed definition, I shall use the definition included in the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the Rio
Pact).20 Of the three definitions, this is the only one that has been
"Id. at 28.
20Id. at 27.
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formally adopted by any group of states in a binding instrument. The
definition is as follows:
Article 1. The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and
undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or
the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article 9. In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation
may characterize as aggression, the following shall be considered as
such:
(a) Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the terri-
tory, the people, or the land, sea or air forces of another State;
(b) Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory
of an American State, through the trespassing of boundaries
demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision, or
arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus demar-
cated, invasion affecting a region which is under the effective
jurisdiction of another State.
Since the legal definition of aggression is, inter alia, to assist national
decision-makers operating in the United Nations, it is useful to employ
the decision-maker level of analysis to examine the definitions. An anal-
ysis from this level of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict will enable us to
examine the type and complexity of problems attendant to the applica-
tion of each definition to a particular international conflict. In doing so
we must also keep in mind that the benefits of hindsight that we may
now employ in examining the 1967 conflict were not available to the
decision-makers in the United Nations at the time of the conflict. I
For the purpose of our analysis, let us assume that the national deci-
sion-makers in the international community are wholly objective in their
perception and evaluation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus we assume
that the events of the past decades have not conditioned the national
decision-makers to any preconceived notions about the merits of the
respective sides. Further we assume that the belligerents are not mem-
bers of any alliance system that will provide political support. Such
assumptions, while they do not comport with the real world as we know
it, enable us to assess with optimum clarity the problem attendant to
the application of each definition to the particular conflict. If we con-
clude that there are difficulties of application under ideal analytical
conditions, we shall be forced to the conclusion that the difficulties
encountered in the real world will be more acute.
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Let us first look at the enumerative definition. 2' This definition has
the advantage of listing particular acts that constitute aggression that a
decision-maker may observe in the conflict. In connection with the 1967
conflict, there was an invasion by armed forces; there was a blockade;
there was the bombardment of the territory of another state; and there
was the support of armed bands that invaded the territory of another
state. The encouragement by Syria of subversive activities and acts of
terrorism against Israel could certainly constitute "indirect aggression."
Moreover, the statements attributed to both sides could be considered
"ideological aggression" since they appear to encourage war propa-
ganda: Israel by its statements in mid-May and the Arab states by their
continued insistence that they would crush and eliminate the state of
Israel.
It is apparent, however, that this definition, because it concentrates
on the "first" act in a sequence of events, poses difficult questions for
the national decision-makers. A decision-maker concentrating on the
question of who initiated the military hostilities on June 5, 1967, will
discover that the facts are not firmly established. The United Arab
Republic's claim that a captured Israeli pilot confessed to Israel's hav-
ing taken the first action does not provide sufficient evidence upon
which a national decision-maker may rely confidently. The United Na-
tions observers in the area could not determine which side initiated the
military hostilities. The confusing data do not enable the decision-maker
to come to an unequivocal decision regarding responsibility for initiat-
ing the action.
Even if the data enabled the decision-maker to conclude with confi-
dence which state initiated the hostile action on June 5th, his conclusion
regarding the existence of aggression would be limited and incomplete.
The decision-maker would have to decide whether to concentrate his
entire attention on that date or to consider the preliminary events as
well. If he shifted his attention to the preliminary events, he would face
the task of identifying the cause and effect in a never-ending sequence
of past events.12 Can a judgment regarding aggression on June 5, 1967,
have any meaning without considering whether or not the blockade of
the Straits of Tiran was a previous act of aggression? A determination
"IPp. 8-10 supra.
22For a summary of the events leading to the initiation of the June 5, 1967, conflict, see STAFF
OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 90TH CONG., IST SESS., A SELECT CHRONOLOGY AND
BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST (Comm. Print 1967); O'Brien,
International Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East, 1967, 9 ORBIs: A QUARTERLY J.
OF WORLD AFFAIRS 692 (1967-1968); Yost, The Arab Israeli War: How It Began, 46 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 304 (1968).
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of the legality of the blockade in turn requires a decision regarding the
validity of the Arab view that the Gulf of Aqaba is historically a na-
tional body of water for the Arab states and that the status of belliger-
ency remains in effect. Furthermore, in making a determination of
aggression, can the decision-maker ignore the Israeli attack on Es
Samu? Is it possible to ignore the El Fatah raids? A decision-maker
seeking to ascertain the initial act of causation is constantly pushed in
the fashion of a pendulum from one event to another in a sequence that
totals over 100,000 incidents.23 He cannot be sure which event is the
cause and which is the effect.
It is clear that a national decision-maker could not apply the enumer-
ative definition of aggression to the Arab-Israeli conflict in any auto-
matic fashion. The definition forces the decision-maker to identify the
one side that committed the wrong, and the implication follows that the
other side was wholly without blame. To make such an identification
and accept its implication would certainly represent a simplistic view of
the Arab-Israeli situation. In addition, the application of the enumera-
tive definition would require drawing conclusions based on uncertain
data and making difficult judgments regarding cause-and-effect rela-
tionships. These are matters over which honest men may differ. We
cannot expect that the decision-makers for the international community
will draw the same conclusions and make the same judgments.
From this examination, it would appear that the enumerative defini-
tion is not useful for a major conflict that has a long series of antecedent
stimuli and responses. Such a definition would appear to be useful
primarily in a surprise-attack situation similar to Pearl Harbor or the
German invasion of Poland.
We must now consider the general-principles definition,24 as favored
by the members of the International Law Commission. The inclusive-
ness of the formula incorporated in the definition also poses problems
of application to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The events of the conflict
would give a decision-maker the clear picture that there was the use of
force and the threat of the use of force by both sides. Moreover, the
recent picture is reinforced by a look at the past two decades. The
difficult question that the formula poses for the decision-maker, how-
ever, is ascertaining the purpose or reason for the use of force.
According to the general-principles definition, the use of force is
justified only if it is for self-defense or the implementation of a decision
"STAFF OF SENATE COMM, ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 90TH CONG., IST SESS., A SELECT CHRO-
NOLOGY AND BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST 19 (Comm. Print 1967).
24P. 10 supra.
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or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations. It is
immediately apparent that the use of force by both sides on June 5th
and in the previous period was not to implement a decision or recom-
mendation of a competent organ of the United Nations.
To ascertain what incidents involving the use of force were for legiti-
mate purposes of self-defense will not be an easy task for a decision-
maker, since matters of intent and motivation must be resolved. To
determine whether the exercise of a right of self-defense is justified in a
particular situation, the decision-maker will need to consider, inter alia,
the priority of actions, the existence and nature of any provocation, the
credibility of the threat of the use of force, the necessity for immediate
action, the proportionality of the response, and the right of preemptive
self-defense. These are difficult questions of fact and of law. The defini-
tion is silent on how they are to be considered.
Using the general-principles definition, the decision-maker would be
able to shift his attention from the "first" acts and the particular events
of June 5th to the overall pattern of hostile events. Thus, the question
of which side actually initiated the military action of any particular day
would become a secondary consideration in assessing the evidence of
aggression. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the decision-maker could con-
clude without too much difficulty that both sides have committed acts
of aggression, or more specifically, acts that were not committed for the
purpose of self-defense. For example, the El Fatah raids against Israel
involving terrorism, harrassment and sabotage were not for the purpose
of self-defense. Nor, could the Israeli raid on Es Samu be classified as
self-defense in view of the disproportionate nature of the response and
the resolution of censure passed by the Security Council. 25
Finally, we must consider the mixed definition, 2 as incorporated in
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. According to this
definition, one question that must be resolved is whether or not the
threat or use of force has been inconsistent with the provisions of the
United Nations Charter. In making such a determination, the decision-
maker must consider the meaning and interpretation of articles 1, 2
(especially paragraph 4), and 51. These articles, however, set forth
broad principles and will not provide operational guidance to the
decision-maker. As suggested earlier, it is possible that some national
decision-makers may conclude that since 1948 both sides have used
force contrary to the provisions of the Charter. Accordingly, both sides
are guilty of committing acts of aggression.
"S.C. Res. 228, 21 U.N. SCOR, 1328th meeting 7 (1966).
11P. II supra.
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The decision-maker will also observe incidents of armed attack in the
pattern of events relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since unprovoked
armed attacks constitute aggression, the decision-maker must ascertain
which attacks were provoked and which were not. Making such a judg-
ment requires, inter alia, a conclusion regarding the priority of acts,
which is difficult in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the nature
and credibility of the provocation. For example, the decision-maker will
need to conclude whether the Israeli raid on Es Samu was provoked by
the El Fatah raids or whether the raid was itself an unprovoked, armed
attack. If the El Fatah raids were a provocation, was the dispropor-
tionate Israeli response a counter provocation?
The mixed definition also cites the invasion of the territory of another
state as an illustration of aggression. The Israeli control of Sinai and
parts of Syria and Jordan leaves no doubt that an invasion occurred.
To some decision-makers this clear fact may be sufficient to label Israel
an aggressor. Other decision-makers may be concerned with whether
the invasion was the result of a proper and legitimate response in self-
defense. While the definition does not specifically mention self-defense,
it does not preclude such a consideration.
We must now take our analysis one more step. We have assumed that
the national decision-makers will be wholly objective as they apply the
legal definitions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But this assumption is not
compatible with the real world. Students of social psychology and deci-
sion making tell us that decision-makers act not on the basis of objective
reality, but on the basis of their perceptions of reality. Two recent
articles, Hypotheses on Misperceptions,7 by Robert Jervis, and
Misperception of Aggression in Vietnam,28 by Ralph K. White, provide
useful points regarding the perceptual process that occurs within the
minds of national decision-makers. Jervis points out that national actors
tend to perceive what they expect to happen. They do not make unbiased
interpretations of data, but are influenced by the theories they expect
to be verified.29 He also points out that there is an overall tendency for
decision-makers to see other states as more hostile than they are."
Thus, a decision-maker will apply the legal definitions not to the
objective reality of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but to his perception of the
conflict. His perception in turn will be influenced by what he expects
the parties to the conflict will do. In the twenty years of the Arab-Israeli
2'Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperceptions, 20 WORLD POLITICS 454 (1968).
2
'White, Misperception of Aggression in Vietnam, 21 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 123 (1967).
"See Jervis, supra note 27, at 455.
"ld. at 475.
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conflict, the national decision-makers appear to have formulated defi-
nite expectations about the acts of the participants. Some decision-
makers, the Soviet Union for example, appear to expect that Israel will
undertake aggressive military action against the Arab states with the
encouragement of the United States and other Western powers. Other
decision-makers, the United States for example, appear to expect that
the Arab states will undertake aggressive military action against Israel
with the encouragement of the Soviet Union. The United States per-
ceives that Israel is an ally and must be supported. The Soviet Union
perceives that the Arab states are allies and must be supported. With
the different expectations of the parties, the national decision-makers
will have different perceptions of the conflict. The application of any
legal definition of aggression to the Arab-Israeli conflict will be compli-
cated immeasurably by these differences in expectations and percep-
tions.
In view of our analysis we are able to draw together several conclud-
ing points. The first point is clear: The legal definitions of aggression
that have been suggested are not operational. They do not enable a
decision-maker to avoid difficult interpretations of fact and of law.
Their application under ideal analytical conditions to a particular inter-
national event requires difficult judgments. Even under ideal conditions,
the use of a legal definition of aggression does not assure that the
national decision-makers, and thus the international community, will
arrive at the same conclusion regarding acts of aggression and the delin-
quent party.
Under real-world conditions, there is even less assurance that the use
of a legal definition of aggression will result in similar or consistent
judgments and conclusions by the members of the international com-
munity. In the process of decision-making at the national and interna-
tional levels, the legal definition of aggression will be applied to a con-
flict after the expectations and perceptions of the conflict are well estab-
lished in the minds of the decision-makers.
The analysis also shows that the definitions permit differing em-
phases. If the concern of the international community is in determining
the delinquence of a state for a specific act, the enumerative definition
would appear to facilitate this type of decision. If, however, the desire
is to review a pattern of events to determine if one or both sides commit-
ted acts of aggression, the general-principles or the mixed definition
would appear to facilitate the determination.
Since the proposed definitions are not operational and would present
difficult problems in application and since the efforts at definition to
[Vol. 2, Supp. 1: 1
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date have not been successful, some may come to the conclusion that
the time and effort have been wasted. I think this is a reasonable and
logical conclusion. However, I would like to hope that the final chapter
has not been written and that a continuing effort may yet bring divi-
dends.
